Media reports of the rapid growth in the number of foreign land acquisitions (FLAs) in many developing countries have brought the phenomenon to the attention of the international community. Early estimates reported the acquisition of millions of hectares, in few years, by private firms, private equity, or governments (e. Following this wave of acquisitions, the nature, drivers, and implications of FLA have become some of the most hotly debated development issues (Schoneveld 2014). On one hand, some in the media and NGOs refer to it as the new "land grab." Their major concerns are the lack of transparency regarding land allocations and the fact that FLA generally favors the expansion of large-scale export-oriented agricultural production. The fear is that these acquisitions may displace local communities from the land, with potentially negative effects on the rural poor and the overall food security of the host economy. On the other hand, FLAs are perceived as an opportunity to reverse the long-term trend of underinvestment in agriculture in developing countries; if this is the case, a new wave of (foreign) investment in agriculture could help create the preconditions for sustained development (World Bank 2011; FAO 2013).
Introduction
Media reports of the rapid growth in the number of foreign land acquisitions (FLAs) in many developing countries have brought the phenomenon to the attention of the international community. Early estimates reported the acquisition of millions of hectares, in few years, by private firms, private equity, or governments (e.g., von Braun and MeinzenDick 2009). The rise in commodity prices and the lack of attractive alternative investment opportunities following the 2008 financial crisis led to marked increases in the demand for agricultural land by foreign firms. Recent studies emphasize the distinguishing features of FLA: the emergence of South-South flows, with new investors from developing countries as well as the Gulf states; the rapid expansion of North-South FLA in new sectors (e.g., biofuels); the concentration of FLA in least-developed countries; the direct involvement of governments in the deals, especially those of target countries (e.g., von Braun and MeinzenDick 2009; UNCTAD 2009; Cotula et al. 2009; World Bank 2011; Arezki, Deininger, and Selod 2015; Anseeuw et al. 2012) . 1 Following this wave of acquisitions, the nature, drivers, and implications of FLA have become some of the most hotly debated development issues (Schoneveld 2014) . On one hand, some in the media and NGOs refer to it as the new "land grab." Their major concerns are the lack of transparency regarding land allocations and the fact that FLA generally favors the expansion of large-scale export-oriented agricultural production. The fear is that these acquisitions may displace local communities from the land, with potentially negative effects on the rural poor and the overall food security of the host economy. On the other hand, FLAs are perceived as an opportunity to reverse the long-term trend of underinvestment in agriculture in developing countries; if this is the case, a new wave of (foreign) investment in agriculture could help create the preconditions for sustained development (World Bank 2011; FAO 2013) .
Nowadays it is widely held that not all FLAs are "land grabs," yet not all FLAs result in agricultural investments fostering growth and development in the developing countries (e.g., Cotula et al. 2009; Wolford et al. 2013) . In fact, the implications of FLAs largely depend upon the nature and reasons for such investments. A number of factors are considered as particularly relevant, such as the actual investments made by foreign investors; employment creation and the development of infrastructure; whether FLAs involve negative environmental externalities and/or knowledge Land Economics and technological spillovers; the nature of the acquired land (is it unused land or do foreign investors compete for land with the local population?); and consultation with the local community (Cotula et al. 2009; FAO 2013; Messerli et al. 2014; Kleemann and Thiele 2015; Nolte and Voget-Kleschin 2014) .
The debate about the impacts of FLA is closely related to the debate about the likely drivers of FLA. A key issue is the role played by institutions. It is often argued that weak governance, in general, and, more specifically, insecure land tenure foster the most negative potential implications of FLA, such as forced dispossessions, speculation, and lack of transparency. Based on these arguments, international organizations recommend a number of "good governance practices" (World Bank 2011; FAO 2013) . 2 On the other hand, the suspicion is that weak governance could itself be a major "locational" driver of large-scale acquisitions. Indeed, it is often argued that the weaker the governance-in particular a weak land tenure system, a weak legal environment, and a high level of corruption-the easier it is for the investor to acquire large-scale portions of land, with little effective opposition from local communities. The empirical evidence on this issue is rather scant. While a considerable number of published case studies have significantly contributed to improving our knowledge of FLAs in specific areas and industries, there have been few analyses of the phenomenon at the global and cross-country level. The few empirical studies estimating the impact of institutional variables on FLA have not found clear-cut evidence, and the results are often not robust. Indeed, several measures of institutional quality of the target country do not significantly affect FLAs in most studies; only poor land governance (Arezki, Deininger, and Selod 2015) and corruption (Bujiko et al. 2016 ) are found to significantly influence FLAs.
This paper aims to contribute to this strand of the literature by providing further empirical 2 In 2012 the Committee on World Food Security adopted the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries, and Forests in the context of national food security. One of the main issues concerns agricultural investments.
evidence on the impact of the quality of institutions on FLAs. We draw on existing literature and try to fill in some of the gaps on three issues in particular.
First, our approach differs slightly from previous literature in that instead of assessing the impact of the institutional quality of the target country, we investigate how the "distance" in institutional quality between the investor country and the target country affects FLAs. Indeed, it is highly likely that the overall effects of institutional quality on FLAs is country-pair specific. Previous literature found that the greater the distance in institutional quality, the lower the foreign direct investments (FDIs) (e.g., Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet, and Mayer 2007; Aleksynska and Havrylchyk 2013; Cezar and Escobar 2015; Demir and Hu 2016) . Does institutional (quality) distance matter for FLAs as well? This may provide an additional perspective on the determinants of FLA. Indeed, while previous studies on FLA have considered differences in land endowment as the main source of the comparative advantage motivating FLA, here we investigate whether the comparative advantage may also originate from differences in the quality of institutions. If this is the case, firms from the South may have an "institutional" comparative advantage when investing in land in developing countries, with respect to firms from north. To the best of our knowledge, the role of the distance in institutional quality in influencing FLAs has been not investigated to date.
Second, we investigate how a number of additional factors may help explain the lack of clear-cut evidence on the impact of institutional quality on FLA. While many studies include, as dependent variable, a count variable, here we consider two different measures of FLA, the number of contracts and the amount of hectares acquired, in that they provide insights into two distinct effects on FLA. Indeed, while the number of contracts can be considered as a proxy for the number of firms involved in FLA, the amount of land proxies the size of the investments. The literature has shown that institutional distance reduces FDI through two distinct channels: by reducing the number of firms involved-the so-called extensive margin-and the size of investments-the intensive margin (Cezar and Escobar 2015) . We, therefore, check whether this also holds for FLA. Moreover, previous literature has shown that the pattern in Africa is different from the one observed in other regions (Asiedu 2002 (Asiedu , 2006 and that the impact of institutional distance varies according to the features of the target country. Hence, we check whether the responsiveness of FLAs to the quality of institutions in Africa differs from other regions; further, we check if this responsiveness depends upon the level of institutional quality in the target country.
Third, we address the issues of FLA data, concerning the quality and the time dimension. Indeed, one important barrier to research in this field is the lack of official cross-country data. As a consequence, studies have been based on information collected by the media or from other unofficial sources, and their conclusions are often open to challenge because of the poor quality of the data on which they are based. 3 We used the most widely used database, the Land Matrix, which includes data from various unofficial sources. First, for each acquisition, we checked the source and the data, and secondly, we ranked the various types of sources in terms of quality. The robustness of our results to the use of different data sources was checked. In addition, we worked with a panel dataset to take into account the time dimension of the data. 4 Previous studies-with Bujko et al. (2016) being the only exception-do not consider the time dimension but use Land Matrix data in a cross-section framework.
We use an unbalanced panel of bilateral land acquisitions data including 66 investor countries, 70 target countries, and 16 years; following the literature analyzing the determinants of FDI, we estimate a panel gravity-like equation using the Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood estimator (PPML) proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) . The gravity equation is the most widely used empirical specification for both FDI and trade, as it has been shown to explain both quite well.
While theoretical foundations for trade gravity equations are well established, the theoretical literature justifying the use of gravity equations to estimate FDI is more recent. We base our empirical specification on the work of Bergstrand and Egger (2010 , 2013a , 2013b and Kleinert and Toubal (2010) , who provide a rationale for estimating time-varying gravity equations of FDI.
Our results, by and large, do confirm that FLAs are significantly affected by the distance in institutional quality and suggest that the greater the gap in institutional quality, the lower the amount of FLA; hence, firms from weak-institutions countries (mostly from South) may have an "institutional comparative advantage" when investing in land in weak-institutions countries. Results also confirm our hypothesis that investments in Africa follow a different pattern, in that distance in governance favors large-scale investments. By using two measures of FLA as dependent variables, we disentangle the effects of institutional distance on the number of firms (the extensive margin) and on the size of investments and show that in a number of countries, the greater the gap in governance, the lower the number of contracts, but the higher the number of hectares of land acquired. Finally, the potentially low quality of some of the data sources does not undermine the main messages coming from our estimations; indeed, the results are quite stable when controlling for the reliability of the data source used.
The Determinants of FLAs: Background
There is a substantial lack of theoretical work on the determinants of FLAs. In general terms, it is reasonable to consider FLA as a particular type of FDI. In many African countries foreign firms agree on long-term land leases (usually one century) with the national government (Cotula 2011) . This happens frequently in the exploitation of natural resources, and because of the long-term duration of the lease and the frequent commitment of foreign firms making investments, this type of arrangement is considered equivalent to FDI (Ruta and Venables Land Economics 2012) . In Latin American or Asian countries, where land is mainly owned and managed by the private sector, FLAs more frequently involve the full transfer of ownership to a foreign firm. Both long-term leases and land ownership transfers qualify as FDIs. The literature has shown that investing firms are often involved in downstream industries (international traders of agricultural products, or processing firms in food and energy industries), and they vertically integrate upward in order to access agricultural raw materials (UCTAD 2009; Cotula et al. 2009; World Bank 2011) . For the above reasons, and in line with previous empirical work on FLA (e.g., Arezki, Deininger, and Selod 2015; Lay and Nolte 2018) , we thus consider FLA as one-way vertical FDI in natural resources. 5 The literature on FDIs has extensively analyzed their economic determinants. Modern general equilibrium models, such as the knowledge-capital model (Markusen 2002; Markusen and Maskus 2002) , simultaneously explain both horizontal and vertical FDI. According to the knowledge-capital model, horizontal FDI is likely to prevail if countries are similar in size and in relative endowments, and trade costs are high, while vertical FDI is more likely to occur when countries differ in factor endowments. Of particular interest for this paper are the contributions by Bergstrand and Egger (2007 , 2013a , 2013b ; they extend the knowledge-capital model to three factors and three countries and propose a theoretical rationale for estimating the determinants of horizontal and vertical FDI by means of a gravity equation. In their model, differences in countries' endowment drive the location of the different stages of production. The greater the differences in factor endowment, the higher vertical FDI appears to be. The empirical specification of the gravity equation developed by Egger (2013a, 2013b ) is drawn from their general equilibrium model.
Whether models explaining FDI are appropriate to examine the determinants of FLA is an open question. Most of the FDI literature focuses on manufacturing industries; however, factors explaining investments in land may be partly different from those driving vertical FDI in the manufacturing sector. Indeed, while the latter are mostly explained by differences in the endowment of skilled, unskilled labor, or capital (Markusen and Maskus 2002; Egger 2013a, 2013b) , this may not be the case for FLA and, more generally, for FDI in natural resources. In our empirical exercise, we build on the theoretically founded specification of the gravity equation for FDI, although we take into consideration the key factors driving the location of FDI in the exploitation of natural resources, namely, the difference in endowments of natural resources (Ruta and Venables 2012) . In the specific context of FLA, previous studies emphasized that the main source of comparative advantage is the relative endowment of land and water (Arezki, Deininger, and Selod 2015; Lay and Nolte 2018) . FLAs mostly source from countries where land and water are scarce, and the acquisitions are located in countries rich in land and water. Hence, our expectation is that the higher the difference in land endowment, the greater the amount of FLA.
Our main interest is the role of institutional variables as determinants of the FLAs. Literature on FDI has shown that good institutions in the destination country and low corruption, by and large, positively affect FDI (e.g., Wei 2000; Stein and Daude 2001; Globerman and Shapiro 2002) . These results confirm the common assumption, based on the growth and financial literature, that better institutions, by increasing productivity, improving the investment climate, and reducing corruption and uncertainty in target countries, tend to have a positive effect on FDI. Other studies have distinguished the impact of democracy from the impact of good governance: the former, by increasing the "voice" of the weakest part of the population (e.g., unskilled workers or rural poor) is likely to be negatively correlated with FDI; more pluralism may increase the bargaining power of workers and rural poor, and this, by reducing the bargaining power of multinational firms, may discourage investment. Conversely, good governance is generally associated with more FDI (Li and Resnick 2003; Berden, Bergstrand, and van Etten 2014) . Asiedu and Lien (2011) have investigated the role of the political regime and found that FDIs are fostered by autocracy, especially in countries where natural resources (minerals and oil) are dominant exports. One reason is that natural resources-and more specifically FLAs-are largely controlled by the governments of host countries. Close ties with host governments are crucial for foreign investors, and this is easier under autocracy.
The impact of the quality of institutions on FLA could also be influenced by the important role played by governments in the allocation of land; also for this reason, the relationship between FLA and the quality of institutions may follow a partially different pattern from that of manufacturing industries. Indeed, it has often been argued that unlike general FDI, poor governance in the destination countries fosters FLA. The argument is that the weaker the governance, the easier it becomes for the investor to acquire large-scale portions of land. However, the empirical evidence is rather scant. Institutional variables have been included as determinants of FLA, but the results are controversial. Arezki, Deininger, and Selod (2015) find that general institutional variables do not affect FLA, while the quality of land governance in the host countries negatively influences acquisitions. Lay and Nolte (2018) find the impact of institutions generally not significant, although their results are not robust to the different specifications and estimators used. Bujko et al. (2016) find that a low level of corruption, regulatory quality, and rule of law all negatively influence FLA, but once again the results are not always robust to different specifications and estimators.
More recent evidence has shown that the impact of the quality of institutions on FDI is country-pair specific. FDI is negatively affected by the institutional "distance," measured as the absolute difference of institutional quality between the origin and destination countries (e.g., Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet, and Mayer 2007; Aleksynska Havrylchyk 2013; Cezar and Escobar 2015; Demir and Hu 2016) . The literature has also shown that this impact differs depending on the country of origin of the investing firm and the destination country (developed vs. developing countries). Indeed, this negative effect has been found to be lower for South-South FDI (Demir and Hu 2016) , for inward-as opposed to outward-FDI in OECD countries (Cezar and Escobar 2015) , and for those developing countries endowed with large reserves of natural resources (Aleksynska and Havrylchyk 2013) .
The basic idea behind the inclusion of institutional distance among the FDI determinants is that firms from countries with weak institutions are likely to face lower costs-when investing in countries with weak institutionsthan investors from countries with strong institutions (Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet, and Mayer 2007; Aizenman and Spiegel 2006) . Recently Cezar and Escobar (2015) have more formally analyzed the impact of institutional distance on FDI within a Melitz-type heterogeneous firms framework (Melitz 2003) . Institutional distance influences the adaptation (fixed) cost for foreign firms: the more similar the institutional environment, the lower the adaptation cost. This implies that an increase in institutional distance, by increasing the fixed costs of investing abroad, raises the productivity threshold above which FDI is profitable and, hence, reduces the number of firms engaged in FDI (the so-called FDI extensive margin). At the same time, an increase in institutional distance also reduces the amount of FDI for already-established multinational firms (the FDI intensive margin).
Several facts seem to suggest that distance in institutional quality may also play a role in explaining the intensive and the extensive margins of FLA. Public authorities of target countries-and in some cases also those of the investing firm country-are often significantly involved in the allocation of land (Cotula et al. 2009; Lay and Nolte 2018) . Firms and governments from similar countries may face lower adaptation costs when investing abroad, being familiar with the institutional environment of the target country; this may help negotiations and, more generally, the relationship with national governments and authorities for land allocations. Our assumption, therefore, is that the greater the institutional distance, the fewer the number of firms that can face the (fixed) adaptation costs and engage in FLA (i.e., the extensive margin). Less straightforward is the likely impact of institutional distance on the Land Economics size of FLAs (i.e., the intensive margin). On one hand, as in the case of FDI, institutional distance may well reduce profits and also the profitability of FLA and, in so doing, may reduce the size of investments (Cezar and Escobar 2015) . However, especially when the allocation of land is managed by national and local public authorities through long-lease arrangements, it might be the case that large firms from developed countries obtain from the government of the (developing) target country larger portions of land. Hence, for countries where FLAs are managed mostly by local public authorities through long-term leases, such as African countries, institutional distance may positively affect the level of investment; this appears to be particularly likely when the target country has very weak institutions.
In our empirical exercise we shall check three main hypotheses: (1) institutional distance negatively affects the number of contracts; (2) the impact of institutional distance on the size of investments differs across regions; and (3) the impact of institutional distance on the size of the investments depends upon the level of the quality of institutions in the target country.
Empirical Strategy
As in previous empirical studies estimating the determinants of FLA (e.g., Arezki, Deininger, and Selod 2015; Lay and Nolte 2018; De Maria 2015) , we use a gravity-like equation, albeit in a panel data framework. The main reason is that, as shown in the next section, the data cover rather a long period, and time-varying factors are likely to significantly influence the pattern of FLA. Moreover, as highlighted by Daude and Stein (2007) and Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet, and Mayer (2007) for the FDI stock, we cannot exclude a priori the possibility that institutions are endogenous to FDI, as foreign investors, becoming a constituency that demands better institutions, might generate positive feedback on the quality of institutions in the host country. Thus, because FLA is a particular type of FDI, we cannot rule out this possible endogeneity. The gravity literature has shown that a panel approach is more appropriate when adjusting for endogeneity than the instrumental-variable and control-function approaches (Baier and Bergstrand 2007) .
The empirical specification of the gravity equation developed by Bergstrand and Egger (2010 , 2013a , 2013b considers three groups of explanatory variables. The first group includes bilateral economic size and economic similarity. They are both expected to positively affect FDI. The second group consists of the usual gravity covariates (distance, contiguity, and language). While distance is expected to negatively affect vertical FDI, language and contiguity are expected to exert a positive effect. The third group includes variables measuring relative factor endowments. As mentioned above, in this context we consider countries' relative endowments in natural resources and, in particular, in land endowment. Our expectation is that FLA will be higher, the more the investor (target) country is relatively scarce (abundant) in land.
It is worth mentioning that our dependent variable is somewhat different from the usual measures of FDI (stocks, flows, or total sales of subsidiaries). As detailed in Section 4, data on FLAs provide the number of contracts and the amount of land acquired. We use both measures of FLA as dependent variables, in order to distinguish the impact on the number of contracts (which proxies the number of firms) from the impact on the amount of land (which proxies the size of investments).
Our basic estimated equation is
where , ij t fla is the stock of hectares (or of contracts) acquired by country i, in country j at time t; , ij t X denotes a vector of control variables (i.e., relative factor endowment, economic size 6 ); ij Z is a vector of gravity covariates including the geographical distance between countries, and two dummies equal to one if countries share a common language or have previous colonial relationships, and zero otherwise; , ij t I is a measure of institutional distance between the two countries.
A key issue of gravity specifications is how to control for multilateral price terms and the possible endogeneity of explanatory variables, as is the case here, of the institutional variables (see Anderson and van Wincoop 2003; Baier and Bergstrand 2007) . In a panel data setting, the multilateral price terms tend to be time-variant, and so, the gravity equation should include time-varying country dummies to account for time-varying multilateral-resistance terms, as well as to eliminate the bias from the "gold-medal error" identified by Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) . 7 In this way, variables that are difficult to measure, such as ''infrastructure, factor endowments, multilateral trade liberalization, and unobserved timespecific shocks, will be captured by the importer-year and exporter-year fixed effects'' (Magee 2008, 353 From an econometric point of view, the main issue in estimating the gravity equation above is related to the choice of the best estimator to identify the effect of institutional distance on FLA. The first issue to take into account is selection bias, as defined by Heckman (1979) , arising from the high number of zeros in our dataset, as reported in the following data section. 8 The second issue concerns heteroskedasticity, which leads to biased estimates when the gravity equation is log-linearized, rather than estimated in levels (Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2006) . The literature tackles these problems by applying either the Heckman selection correction (Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein 2008) or the PPML estimator proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) . Due to the panel structure of our dataset, we prefer to use the latter estimator to avoid the incidental parameter problem of the first-stage (probit) Heckman model. Moreover, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006, 2011) have shown that this estimator, robust to different patterns of heteroskedasticity and measurement error, is particularly suitable in the presence of many zeros.
The Data

Foreign Land Acquisitions
The most widely used data on FLAs are those collected and classified by the Land Matrix. 9 This database contains domestic and transnational land acquisitions and reports, for each recorded deal, target country, location, investor name and country of origin, the "intention" of the deal (agriculture, energy, forestry, etc.), negotiation and implementation status (intended, concluded, failed), the size of the area, the nature of the deal (sale, lease, or concession), the type of agreement (oral or written), the crops, and the data source type. 10 Because our focus is on acquisition by foreign firms, we have considered only deals where at least one foreign firm is involved; further, we have limited our analysis to concluded deals (both oral and written). Overall, our database covers 1,050 deals. 11 The quality of the Land Matrix data is a major issue for empirical analyses. Land deals are notoriously opaque and often negotiated in secret. The release and transparency of information regarding such data vary widely across target countries. In a limited number of countries, data on FLAs are relatively easy 9 The Land Matrix Global Observatory is a database compiled by NGOs and research institutes coordinated by the International Land Coalition (Anseeuw et al. 2012) . Data are verified by the partners and include deals starting from 2000.
10 These include research papers and policy reports by international, local, and nongovernmental organizations; personal information contributed through the Global Observatory website; field-based research projects; official government records; company websites; and media reports.
11 As we consider only concluded deals, for the sake of simplicity, from now on we will refer to them as "contracts." Data were downloaded from Land Matrix in October 2015. The Land Matrix database is continuously updated, and hence, information downloaded from the database could change overtime.
Land Economics to access. 12 In others, for instance Sudan and Colombia, governments and firms do not release any information, so NGOs or the media are the main source. These have been criticized, not only because of the obvious disadvantages of unverified data, but also because of a tendency to overestimate the phenomenon (Oya 2013; Schoneveld 2014) . Collection methodology and definitions may vary from country to country, and errors often occur in recording the data. Since 2013, however, the Land Matrix has been considerably improved and the issue of data reliability addressed by including in the database the source, so that researchers can make their own judgment about data quality (Anseeuw et al. 2013) . We have used this information to address the issue of data quality by following a two-step procedure.
First, we checked whether the source and the data reported in the Land Matrix are still verifiable. We verified-for each of the 1,050 deals here considered-the availability of the source (research papers, institutional and company websites, media reports) reported in the Land Matrix and the corresponding "size of the contract." When the sources reported in the Land Matrix were no longer available, alternative sources on the web were considered, for each contract; firstly by looking for "official" data released by governments, then, in the absence of that, by analyzing the investing firm's profile, including all companies controlled by the investor.
Second, we classified all observations according to their main (verified) source of information. In the context of FLA, official data released by governments are, by and large, reliable. Less straightforward is how to consider other sources in terms of reliability. Following Schoneveld (2014) , our hypothesis is that information released by firms is usually likely to be more reliable than information provided by other sources. The reason is that this information is generally verified by government 12 One example is Cambodia, where the government provides information about FLAs through an official document. (Municipality and Province Investment Information, Kratie Province, downloadable from the government website http://www.cambodiainvestment.gov. kh). In Indonesia as well, data are easily accessible, even though sourced from investing firms. agencies, for example, for taxes purposes; in addition, with public companies, shareholders have an interest in checking the accuracy of the information released by firms. In our analysis two possible sources of data are thus considered: on the one hand, governments and firms and, on the other, all other sources. In the econometric analysis, we then check the robustness of the results through the use of a different subsample of sources that corresponds to a better level of data quality.
Finally, by using the investor-country origin and the target-country destination information reported by the Land Matrix dataset, we aggregated the number of hectares acquired and the number of contracts at the country level and cumulated over the analyzed period. Our final (bilateral) country-level dataset includes the stock of FLAs, from one investor country to a target country during the period 2000-2015, and considers 109 different countries: 43 are target countries only, 39 are investing countries only, and 27 are both target and investor countries (more details are in Appendix  Table A1 ).
Accordingly, squaring the dataset, our unbalanced panel of bilateral data includes 66 investor countries, 70 target countries, and 16 years. The idea behind the selection of countries included in the sample is that all 66 countries reporting at least one contract with one of the 70 target countries are considered as potential investors over the analyzed period. This implies a considerable number of zeros, mainly concentrated in the years 2000-2006, as the majority of contracts were made after the 2007 crisis (see Figure 1 ). This high percentage of zeros is an important issue that needs to be properly addressed, as explained in the econometric section.
Overall, data from reliable sources, namely, governments and firms, account for about two-thirds of the total hectares reported by the Land Matrix (see Appendix Table A2 ). Government data are much more frequent when acquisitions occur in East Asia (almost two-thirds of total hectares). East Africa and southern Africa are more problematic in terms of data reliability; indeed, almost half of the data comes from sources other than firms and governments. Thus, if we were to use only the data sourced from governments and firms, al-most 80% of the excluded hectares would be in Africa.
Our dataset confirms that Africa, and especially West Africa, hosts the largest part of FLAs, accounting for about 54% of total land. 13 East Asia accounts for about one-quarter of total land, while the Americas only 10%. It is worth noting that all target countries are from South.
On the investor side, the main regions involved are the Americas, Western Europe, 14 and East Asia and the Pacific, which jointly make up 80% of total land acquired (Table 1) , with the United States, United Kingdom, and Malaysia as the main investors (38%). North America and Western Europe account for half of the hectares acquired, while the other half is from South firms, mostly from East Asia. Thus, South-South FLAs account for half of the hectares acquired.
13 When considering only these more reliable sources, African countries account for 44% of the total land acquired.
14 It is worth noting that "Rest of Europe" in Table 1 includes all Western Europe and Turkey. Hence the largest part of FLA from this area comes from Western Europe. Table 1 reports also the number of contracts by geographical region and shows a slightly different pattern. 15 Indeed, the share of some regions as investor or target region is different when measured in terms of hectares as opposed to contracts. The reason is that the average size of the acquisitions is an important country-pair characteristic. In general terms, the average size of the acquisitions is higher in African countries and lower in Latin America and Asia; further, the size of FLAs by North American firms is, on average, higher than those by European and Asian firms.
Gravity and Control Variables
Data on country distance, and the other gravity variables used in similar exercises such as dummies for common language and colonial relationship, come from CEPII (Centre 15 In 115 (out of 1,050) contracts there are two or more foreign investing firms. Land Matrix does not provide information about the relative weight of each investor in the contract, so we have assumed that each investor contributes equally to the contract. Accordingly, the number of hectares has been allocated in equal parts to the investing countries, and the final number of contracts in our dataset is 1,168. Following Bergstrand and Egger (2010 , 2013a , 2013b ) bilateral economic size is measured by the log of the sum of the countries' GDP. GDP data come from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank (WDI). 17 16 See http://www.cepii.fr/cepii/en/bdd_modele/presenta tion.asp?id=6. 17 See https://data.worldbank.org/products/wdi. We have also included a measure of the GDP similarity, measured as log[(GDP i ) × (GDP t )/(GDP i + GDP t ) 2 ]. Its impact on FLA is negative and significant. However, we cannot include both GDP variables (bilateral economic dimension and economic similarity) because of collinearity problems. There is no As for the relative factor endowment ratio (RFE), literature on FLA has pointed out that often investing firms originate from countries poorly endowed in agricultural land and invest in countries relatively abundant in land (see, e.g., von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009; World Bank 2011). Hence, we consider countries' relative endowment in agricultural land as a key factor driving the location of FLAs. Following Kleinert and Toubal (2010) , who considered the relative endowment of countries in terms of skilled and unskilled labor, we compute RFE as the difference between the share of the investor's agricultural land, in change in any of the estimated results when the sum of countries' GDP is used rather than GDP similarity. 
Institutional and Political Variables
Many sources provide ratings of the level of countries' democratization, corruption, and governance. Because each measure and source has certain drawbacks, our choice is to include different variables from a variety of sources. 21 For the level of democratization we use two measures; the first is a measure of political 18 Nonagricultural land is measured as the difference between a country's total area and agricultural land. Both data come from the WDI database.
19 It is worth mentioning that there is considerable disagreement about the "type" of land that mostly attracts FLA. On one hand, some studies conclude that FLA is mostly attracted by (target) countries relatively rich in uncultivated land or in forests (Arezki, Deininger, and Selod 2015) ; on the other hand, other studies highlight a more differentiated geographical pattern and reveal that a considerable share of FLA is concentrated in highly populated and already cultivated areas (Messerli et al. 2014; Schoneveld 2014) . Our approach differs slightly from these studies, in that we consider the differences in land endowment between the investor country and the target country. 20 To check robustness we have also considered different measures of relative factor endowment, in particular the land/population ratio and the capital/land ratio (measured as the gross fixed capital formation per hectare of agricultural land). The main results of our estimations-not reported for lack of space but available on request-do not change. 21 The use of a panel framework forces us to exclude all those measures of institutional quality that are not available for every year.
rights from the Freedom House 22 (PolRights). It ranges between 1 and 7: a rating of 1 implies the presence of competitive parties and of an opposition that plays an important role. When the rating is 7, political rights are absent. The second measure of democratization comes from the democracy index published by Polity IV 23 (Polity). 24 It provides a single regime score that ranges from +10 (full democracy) to -10 (full autocracy) and reflects the openness and the competitiveness of the political process.
For the measurement of corruption we use two indexes: the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and the Control of Corruption Index (Corr). The first, CPI, is provided by Transparency International. 25 This is a composite index, a combination of surveys and assessments of corruption collected by a variety of reputable institutions, that measures, on a scale of 10, the perceived level of corruption of a given country's public sector. CPI ranges from 0 to 10, with 0 corresponding to the highest level of corruption. The second index, Control of Corruption, is taken from the World Governance Indicators 26 (WGI) database compiled by the World Bank. This index (Corr) captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both minor and major forms of corruption. It ranges from 0 to 100, with 100 being the lowest level of corruption. Although it might seem redundant to include two different indicators of the same issue, it should be acknowledged that these data do not measure corruption per se, but only opinions as to its prevalence, and measuring corruption remains a highly subjective task (Treisman 2007) .
In addition to the above indexes of corruption, we use the other five institutional variables developed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010) and included in the WGI database. The first two concern the process by Land Economics which governments are selected (and partially overlap with the aforementioned democracy indexes). Voice and accountability (Acc) focuses on different indicators related to the political process, civil rights, and institutions that facilitate public participation in selecting the government; freedom of expression and association; and free media. Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (Stability) measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism. Two indexes concern the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies. Regulatory quality (RegQuality) captures perceptions of the ability of government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Government effectiveness (Effectiveness) captures perceptions of the quality of bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the quality of public service provision, and the credibility of the government's commitment to its policies. Finally, two indexes measure the respect of citizens and the state for institutions. One is Control of Corruption-mentioned above-and the second is rule of law (RoL), which captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and comply with the rules of society and, in particular, the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts. All these variables range between 0 and 100, with the highest values corresponding to better institutions.
Finally, following Aleksynska and Havrylchyk (2013), we construct a simple average of these indicators (InstQuality) by using the six measures of institutional quality developed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010) from the WGI database.
To facilitate the comparison of the different measures, we follow Asiedu and Lien (2011) and normalize and make uniform all institutional variables between 0 and 1, so that the highest value, 1, always implies better governance, a higher level of democratization, and a lower level of corruption. Finally, following Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet, and Mayer (2007) and Aleksynska and Havrylchyk (2013) , we construct our measure of institutional "distance" as the absolute difference between the origin country and the destination country.
Most of the institutional variables show a remarkably significant correlation; from an econometric point of view, this can induce serious problems of multicollinearity (Daude and Stein 2007) . Consequently, in our estimations we include one variable at a time.
A preliminary glance at the data shows that the relationship between the institutional quality distance and FLA may vary according to the characteristics of the target country, as the empirical literature has found for FDI in general (e.g., Demir and Hu 2016; Cezar and Escobar 2015; Aleksynska and Havrylchyk 2013) . More specifically, two characteristics of the target country seem to affect this relationship: the level of institutional quality and geographical location. Figure 2 plots, for African and non-African target countries, the total hectares acquired (or the number of contracts), with respect to the institutional quality (InstQuality) of the target country, and to the distance between the investor country and the target country as regards institutional quality. The size of the "circle" measures the stock of FLA for each country pair, at the end of the analyzed period (2015) . When using hectares as a proxy for FLA, the pattern of African countries appears to be quite different from that of other target countries. In fact, for the former, the larger the institutional distance, the higher the amount of land acquired, and this is especially true for target countries with very weak institutions. Conversely, for non-African countries, institutional distance seems to be associated with less land acquisition. When using the number of contracts, we find much less difference between African and non-African countries, and greater institutional distance seems to be associated with a lower number of contracts for all target countries. Further, we note that the relationship between the number of hectares and institutional distance seems to be affected by the level of institutional quality in the target country. Indeed, when the latter is very low, greater distances are associated with larger FLAs, while this is not the case for target countries with strong institutions. These hypotheses are explored in more detail in our econometric analysis.
Results
Tables 2 and 3 report the results obtained by using equation [1] , when the dependent variable is the amount of the acquired land and the number of contracts, respectively. Starting with the traditional gravity variables, we observe that for both FLA measures, geographical distance exerts a negative impact, as expected for vertical FDI, while common language has a positive impact. In particular, our findings show that country pairs sharing a common language tend to invest 80% more in each other than otherwise. 27 Conversely, the 27 To measure this effect we used the results of column (1) in Table 2 : (=exp(0.597) -1).
Figure 2 Foreign Land Acquisitions and Institutional Distance (2015)
Source: Authors' analysis based on Land Matrix dataset and institutional quality indicator from the World Governance Indicators (see text).
Table 2
Impact of Institutional Distance on Foreign Land Acquisitions: Effects on the Hectares Acquired * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table 3
Impact of Institutional Distance on FLAs: Effects on the Number of Contracts 
(8) * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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coefficients of "colonial relation" positively affect the number of contracts only; hence, former colonial relationships increase the number of contracts, but not the number of hectares acquired. Control variables are generally significant across all estimations and have the expected sign: the sum of countries' GDP positively affects foreign investment in land, in line with the empirical literature on FDI and gravity. As for relative factor endowment, our findings confirm that this is a major driver in terms of the size of land acquisition, whereas when we use the number of contracts as the dependent variable, the coefficient of RFE, albeit negative, is not significant ( Table 3) .
The impact of institutional distance is, by and large, negative and significant, and this is the case for both our dependent variables. 28 This result confirms general expectations and the findings presented by previous literature regarding total FDI (Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet, and Mayer 2007; Demir and Hu 2016; Cezar and Escobar 2015; Aleksynska and Havrylchyk 2013) , suggesting that all else being equal, the greater the gap in governance and democracy, the less the amount of land acquired and the number of contracts. 29 In particular, considering the hectares acquired in Table 2 , a strong impact can be observed for four indexes. The most significant is the CPI, that is, the level of perceived corruption in a given country; the size of coefficients suggests that were there no gap between the investor countries and target countries, the hectares acquired would be 50% more, on average: δFLA/δCPI = 1.7372 × (0.29 -0) ≈ 0.50. 30 The second index captures 28 One exception concerns the distance in RegQuality. For this variable a wider gap exerts a positive effect, although only on the number of the hectares acquired. As will be noted below, this countertrend is probably the outcome (average effect) of countries following a different (opposite) pattern. 29 As FLAs are very few in the first half of the analyzed period, we check whether this unduly influences results. Thus, we run all regressions of Table 2 by using a subsample that excludes data before the year 2007. The results do not change the signs and the significance of our institutional quality distances. Results are not reported but are available upon request. 30 We measure these effects by using the results of Table 2  and Appendix Table A3. compliance with the rule of law (RoL), such as property rights; where the rule of law is the same, the hectares acquired would increase by 41%, on average: δFLA/δRoL = 1.017 × (0.40 -0) ≈ 0.41.The third index impacting on FLA is voice and accountability (Acc); this estimated coefficient shows that a similar level, between investor country and target country, of freedom of expression and participation in selecting a government would increase the FLA hectares by 29% : δFLA/δAcc = 0.7819 × (0.37 -0) ≈ 0.29. The fourth reflects the openness of the political process (Polity); it shows that a zero gap in democracy would increase the hectares acquired, on average, by 41%: δFLA/δPolity = 1.2479 × (0.33 -0) ≈ 0.41. An example may help to better illustrate the negative effect of distance on FLA. Consider two target countries with very different levels of democratization: Laos, one of the least democratic countries (polity = 0.15), and Uruguay, a country with a high democracy score (Polity = 1). Regression results in Table 2 , column (2), show that ceteris paribus, an increase in democracy from the level of Laos to the level of Uruguay, by narrowing the gap with investor countries, would increase bilateral FLA by about 106% (=1.2479 × (1 -0.15)) in terms of hectares acquired. Finally, the effect of the institutional quality average index combines the impacts of each single component (columns 5-10) and is negative but not significant (see column 11).
Results of estimations using the number of contracts as a dependent variable are reported in Table 3 . Here, the impact of all institutional distances is always negative and significant. The size of coefficients is rather high, highlighting the negative effect that the difference in institutions exerts on the number of contracts. An identical institutional quality index of two countries would increase the number of FLA contracts by 1.43 percentage points: δFLA/δInstQuality = 3.968 × (0.36 -0) ≈ 1.43.
Overall, the findings obtained from the estimations using the whole sample offer a number of interesting insights. For indexes measuring the level of democracy (Polity, PolRights, and Acc) and corruption (CPI, Corr) , the impact on FLA-measured as ei-ther the number of hectares or the number of contracts-is always negative. Hence, target countries with a level of democratization or corruption similar to one of the investor countries attract more firms and greater investment in land. In line with previous findings for general FDI (Cezar and Escobar 2015) , we find that as regards foreign investments in land, political and (all except one) governance distances impact negatively both on the number of firms (in our context proxied by the number of contracts) and on the level of investment (in our case proxied by the number of hectares acquired).
The findings obtained for all countries could be the result of different and contrasting patterns-as suggested also by our descriptive analysis (see Section 4, Figure 2 )-due, among other things, to the different institutional arrangements for land allocations. We therefore check whether the impact of institutional distance varies for African countries, and with level of institutional quality in the target country.
Is Africa Different?
We estimate the same specifications as in Tables 2 and 3 by splitting our dataset into two groups according to the target country, in this case, African and non-African countries. 31 Figure 3 32 summarizes the impact of institu- 31 We split the dataset instead of interacting the institutional quality variables with a dummy variable for African countries, to allow the traditional gravity and control variables to exert a different role in the two groups. The results show that the effect of country distance and of the relative factor endowment variable is generally lower for African countries than for "all other" target countries, while the effect of common language is generally high and significant only for African countries. Those coefficients are not reported but are available upon request.
32 Figure 3 reports political and institutional distance effects on FLAs, estimated with equation [1] , as in Tables  2 and 3 , but distinguishing African and non-African target countries. All regressions use the PPML estimator and include the sum of countries' GDP, relative factor endowment, distance, common language, common continent, colonial relationship, investor-year, target-year, and year fixed effects not reported. All political and institutional covariates refer to the absolute difference of the variable between investor country and target country. The figure reports all estimated coefficients; bar shows 95% confidence intervals. The X's indicate significance below the 5% level.
tional distances on FLAs for the two groups of target countries.
The results for African countries show that when using, as dependent variable, the stock of hectares of land acquired, the coefficients of a number of institutional distances-Corr, RegQuality, Effectiveness, Stability, and the average institutional quality index (InstQuality)-become positive and significant; 33 only the coefficients of variables measuring different levels of democratization (Polity, PolRights, and Acc) maintain a negative and significant effect on FLAs. In particular, for African countries, the distance in RegQuality, that is, a government's ability to implement policies that permit and promote private sector development, turns out to be the most relevant. By removing this distance, in other words, by increasing "government ability" in African countries, the hectares acquired in the region would decrease by more than 103%, on average.
When the dependent variable is the number of contracts, both democratic and governance distances always exert a negative effect. The most marked (negative) impact on the number of contracts is exerted by the distance in corruption (CPI) and property rights (RoL): a gap equal to zero would increase the number of contracts, on average, by 37% and 44%, respectively.
Thus, when FLA involves African countries, the greater the difference between investor county and target country in terms of governance, the greater the amount of land acquired, but not the number of contracts. Thus, the wider the gap in governance, the more likely is the prevalence of a few large-scale projects, instead of many small ones. This result confirms observations in our preliminary data analysis (see Figure 2) . Conversely, the gap in democracy negatively affects both dependent variables. Figure 3 also reports results for non-African countries and shows that-with the exception of Stability, RegQuality, and Effectiveness, whose coefficients are not significant in 33 Note that with the exception of RegQuality, these variables are not significant in the estimations using all target countries (see Table 2 ).
explaining the number of hectares acquiredgovernance and political distances exert a significant negative impact on both measures of FLA: the number of contracts and the hectares of land acquired. In particular, corruption (CPI) exerts a strong impact on FLA: with a zero gap in the level of corruption, hectares would increase by more than 90% and the number of contracts up to 1.7 times, on average. Hence, for non-African countries, our findings are in line with those for general FDI: institutional distance negatively affects the number of firms and the size of the investment. While for FLAs in Africa the gap in the ability of governments to effectively formulate and implement "sound" policies positively affects the level of investment, it does not affect the size of investments in non-African countries. Finally, it is worth noting that the distance in corruption increases (reduces) the size of investment in African (non-African) countries.
The results observed for FLA in Africa confirm previous findings for investments in Africa (e.g., Asiedu 2002 Asiedu , 2006 Cerbu, Swallow, and Thompson 2011) and our own expectations. As aforementioned, in Africa host governments and local public administrations allocate most of the land, whereas in other continents land is mainly acquired through contracts with local private firms. Once contact with governments and local administrators in the target country has been made and contracts signed, firms from stronger governance countries find it convenient to increase their investments, probably to exploit economies of scale; the higher the distance in governance, the greater the ability of (few) firms from North to negotiate the allocation of large portions of land with target country governments. 34
Does the Quality of Institutions in the Target Countries Matter?
Preliminary analysis of the data suggests that the relationship between FLA and institutional distance also varies according to the level of institutional quality in the target country (see Figure 2) .To investigate the role played by 34 Indeed, as mentioned before, the "North" group includes a few developed countries (Western Europe, North America, Australia, and Japan) showing definitely higher institutional distances from the target countries, compared to all South investors. the level of institutional quality in the target country, we run estimations by interacting this measure with the institutional distance. 35 The predicted FLA are derived from these estimations (Figure 4 36 ) , by varying the distance in our institutional quality average index and holding constant at three different values (the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile) the index of the target country. The upper two graphs of Figure 4 confirm that in general terms, an increase in institutional distance reduces both the predicted hectares and contracts, although with some important differences. First, we note that while the quality of institutions of the target country does not affect this pattern in terms of number of contracts (upper right graph), countries with a low institutional quality (the 10th percentile) do show a different pattern in terms of size of investments (upper left graph): indeed, for the latter, the greater the institutional distance, the higher the size of FLAs. These findings confirm expectations: when institutions in a target country are weak (few) firms from North countries are likely to engage in large-scale investments. Second, for a given level of institutional distance, the predicted hectares (upper left graph) are much lower for target countries with high institutional quality (90th percentile) than for those 35 We report these results in Appendix Table A4 . The results show that the interaction term is negative and significant when the dependent variable is the hectares of land, and positive and significant with the number of contracts (see column 10). Columns 1-9 of Appendix Table A4 report the results for each measure of institutional quality. Corr, RoL, and Effectiveness show the same effect observed for the InstQuality average index: a higher institutional quality in the target country increases the (negative) effect of the institutional quality distance over hectares, while it reduces the (negative) effect over contracts.
36 Figure 4 reports the predicted effects of institutional distance on FLAs (thousands of hectares and number of contracts), estimated with interaction between the institutional quality of the target country and its distance with the investor country. Regressions use the PPML estimator and include the sum of countries' GDP, relative factor endowment, distance, common language, common continent, colonial relationship, investor-year, target-year, and year fixed effects. By distinguishing between African and non-African target countries, the figure shows the estimated predicted hectares (thousands) when institutional quality distance increases (from 0 to 0.99), holding the institutional quality of the target country constant at three different values: the 10th, the 50th, and the 90th percentile.
with a lower institutional quality. By contrast, the predicted number of contracts (upper right graph) are higher the better the institutional quality in the target country. Finally, the lower left graph shows that overall for African target countries, the greater the distance, the larger the size of investments, whereas the opposite is observed for non-African target countries (lower right graph).
Thus, the main message from all this is that when the target country is weak in terms of institutions, and especially in African countries, large-scale North-South FLAs are particularly favored, while South-South FLAs tend to be favored in target countries with relatively strong institutions.
Robustness Check: Do Data Source and Quality Matter?
As described in the previous section, the quality of the Land Matrix data is the key issue for empirical analyses. Thus, as a robustness check, we run all previous regressions using data from more reliable sources only, namely, governments and firms. Appendix Tables A5  and A6 present the results of the estimations,  as in Tables 2 and 3 , but using the subsample of data from more reliable sources. Similarly, Appendix Figure A1 , which is analogous to Figure 3 , reports a synthesis of our estimations using only this restricted source of data for African and non-African target countries. Results reported in Appendix Tables A5 and  A6 confirm previous findings, maintaining the same signs and the same significance levels. In particular, institutional distances maintain a negative and significant effect on the hectares acquired, while regulatory system quality (RegQuality) is confirmed to exert a positive and significant influence. Moreover, institutional distance maintains, overall, a significant negative effect on the number of contracts for all variables, with coefficients that are generally larger (in absolute value) than those estimated using all the data, and are slightly lower only for democracy (Polity, PolRights) and Acc distances.
The robustness check is particularly relevant for African countries; indeed, as mentioned in Section 4, the share of unofficial (and less reliable) data is high for this continent, Land Economics especially in terms of hectares acquired. Interestingly, the estimates obtained reinforce our previous findings. Indeed, as shown in Appendix Figure A1 , when the dependent variable is land, the distance in the level of democratization maintains a negative and significant impact; further, distance in corruption (both CPI and Corr), regulatory quality (RegQuality), and stability of government (Stability) still show a positive impact on the hectares acquired. At the same time, the signs of coefficients remain negative when using the number of contracts as dependent variable. Hence, our main findings appear robust to the use of more reliable data for Africa, as well.
Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to provide further cross-country evidence on the impact of institutional quality on foreign investments in
Figure 4
Predicted Foreign Land Acquisitions land. Our approach differs in some respects from previous studies. Instead of checking whether and how the quality of institutions in target countries affects FLAs, we investigate the role exerted by the distance in institutions between the target and the investor countries. Moreover, we use different measures of FLA (number of contracts and hectares acquired) that proxy, by and large, the impact of distance on the number of firms (extensive margin) and the size of investments and check whether the responsiveness of FLAs in African countries and in countries with weak institutions is different from elsewhere. Finally, we check the robustness of our results with regard to the reliability of the data sources.
The results seem to confirm our expectations. We find quite robust evidence for the hypothesis that the distance in institutional quality exerts a negative effect on bilateral FLAs, measured either by the hectares acquired or by the number of contracts. The greater the gap in governance and democracy between the investor countries and the target countries, the lower the amount of FLA. Thus, FLA seems to follow the same pattern found in the literature for general FDI (Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet, and Mayer 2007; Demir and Hu 2016; Cezar and Escobar 2015; Aleksynska and Havrylchyk 2013) , and we confirm the hypothesis that firms from countries with stronger institutions face higher costs when investing in countries with weak institutions. This sheds new light on the recent growth of South-South FLA. Indeed, besides the key factors based on the lack (abundance) of land and water in the investing (target) countries already underlined in the literature, we find also that institutional comparative advantages may be significant in determining the pattern of FLA; similarity in political regime and governance may drive countries from the South to invest in that part of the South that is rich in natural resources.
The hypothesis that Africa follows a clearly different pattern from other regions is confirmed by the results. Indeed, while political distance negatively affects FLA, the gap in governance fosters the amount of hectares acquired in Africa, though not the number of contracts. These results suggest that the weaker the level of governance in target countries in Africa, the more investors prefer large-scale contracts. Finally, this evidence also confirms that the dependent variable used in empirical analysis matters, as it provides different information about FLA and could partly help to explain the ambiguous findings in the literature. Moreover, by using only the most reliable data sources, the main conclusion of our results are confirmed.
These findings may have some interesting implications, as they show that reducing corruption and improving overall governance in the target country may significantly influence the number of investors and the number of hectares acquired, but that the direction of these effects depends upon the geographical region and the institutional quality of the target country. Further, our results show that an improvement in overall governance and pluralism in countries with the weakest institutions may change the pattern of FLA, in terms of origin of investing firms (South vs. North). Whether these effects would be positive or negative from the point of view of the target country is a key question but outside the scope of this paper.
On the whole, our results provide some insight into the impact of institutional quality on the pattern of FDI in a (natural resources) sector where the public sector plays a key role. Empirical cross-country evidence for FLA is rather scant, although its role in the overall pattern of South-South FDI is increasingly important and highly sensitive politically. This paper aims to help fill a gap in current knowledge on this issue. We are aware, however, of the need to improve and widen the empirical analysis in different directions. Although our main findings do not seem to be seriously affected by the use of unofficial sources, improvements in the quality and availability of data are essential for a full understanding of the potential determinants and effects of FLAs. This would allow us to explore a number of issues related to the institutional drivers of FLA, such as whether the responsiveness of FLA to institutional quality differs according to the public or private nature of the investor, to the final use of the land acquired (biofuels, food, or other), or to the ownership of land acquired and business model prevailing in the target country.
